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APPRENDI v. NEW JERSEY
120 S. CT. 2348 (2000)
FACTS
The police arrested Charles C. Apprendi, Jr. on December 22, 1994, for
firing into the home of an African American family who had recently moved
to a previously all-white community in Vineland, New Jersey.' Apprendi
admitted to being the shooter and initially stated to the police that he shot into
the home because did not want a black family living in his neighborhood.
However, Apprendi later retracted his statement explaining that his motive for
the shooting was divorced from racial bias.3
A New Jersey grand jury indicted Apprendi on twenty-three counts,
charging shootings on four different dates and unlawful possession of
weapons.4 The indictment did not refer to the New Jersey hate crime statute
5
and did not allege that Apprendi's crime had been racially motivated.6
Apprendi pleaded guilty to two counts (counts 3 and 18) charging second-
degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose and one count (count
22) charging a third-degree offense of unlawful possession of an antipersonal
bomb.' The plea agreement stipulated that the sentence for the third degree
offense would run concurrently with the sentences for the second degree
offenses.8 The prosecutor dismissed the other twenty counts, but reserved the
right to request an enhanced sentence under New Jersey's hate crime
provision. 9 Apprendi reserved the right to challenge the constitutionality of
the sentence enhancement."0
New Jersey's hate crime statute authorized the trial judge to impose an
"extended term" of imprisonment if the judge finds by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant acted with a "biased purpose."" A defendant is
found to have had "biased purpose" if "in committing the crime [he] acted
with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of
race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity."' 2 If a
i. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2351 (2000).
2. Id. at 2351.
3. Id. at 2351-52. Apprendi claimed that "he shot into the house 'because the glass and the purple
door' caught his eye and that at the time of the incident, he was under the influence of alcohol and drugs."
State v. Apprendi, 698 A.2d 1265, 1267 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
4. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2352.
5. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2c:44-3(e) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000).
6. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2352.
7. Id. (citations omitted).
8. Id.
9. Id. See N.J. STAT. ANN. 0 2c:44-3(e).
10. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2352.
11. Id.
12. Id.; (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2c:44-3(e)).
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judge concludes by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had a
biased purpose, the judge may "enhance" the defendant's sentence range to be
equivalent to that of an offense that is one degree higher.' 3 In other words, if
a judge finds that a defendant who is found guilty of a second degree offense
with a sentence range of five to ten years had a biased purpose, the judge can
sentence the defendant to ten and twenty years, the range for a first degree
crime. 4The trial judge heard evidence sufficient to establish Apprendi's guilt at
the plea hearing and confirmed that Apprendi understood the maximum
potential sentence for his plea. 5 The prosecutor then moved for an
"enhanced" sentence for count 18 under the hate crime provision on grounds
that it was racially motivated.' 6 Without the sentence enhancement, the
maximum aggregate sentence for Apprendi would have been twenty years, a
maximum of ten years for each of the second degree offenses, count 3 and
18."7 With the sentence enhancement, however, the maximum aggregate
sentence would be thirty years, ten years maximum for count 3 and an
enhanced maximum of twenty years for count 18.18
At the evidentiary hearing to determine whether Apprendi's purpose had
been biased, the trial judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that
Apprendi's actions were taken with the purpose to intimidate, thus satisfying
the statutory requirement.19 The trial judge rejected Apprendi's constitutional
challenge and applied the hatecrime sentence enhancement. 20 Apprendi was
sentenced to twelve years imprisonment for the enhanced count (count 18) and
shorter concurrent terms for the other two counts (counts 3 and 22).21
On his appeal to the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court,
Apprendi argued that the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution
required a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that his action had been
motivated by racial bias.22 The appellate court held that the Constitution did
not require the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard to be applied to
13. State v. Apprendi, 698 A.2d 1265, 1267 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
14. id. at 1267 (citations omitted).
15. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2352.
16. Id. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2c:44-3(e).
17. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2352.
18. Id.
19. Id.; See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2c:44-3(e). The trial judge may impose an "extended" term of
imprisonment if he finds by a preponderance of the evidence that "the defendant in committing the crime
acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals based because of race, color, gender,
handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity." Id.
20. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2352.
21. Id.
22. Apprendi, 698 A.2d at 1268. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1.
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sentencing factors that were not elements of a crime.' The court rejected
Apprendi's argument, reasoning that racial bias was not an element of the
crime and found that it was merely a sentencing factor.2 Apprendi reappealed
the same issue to the New Jersey Supreme Court, which affirmed on similar
grounds.2 -
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on March 28, 2000 to
decide whether Apprendi had a constitutional right to have a jury determine




The United States Supreme Court reversed the New Jersey Supreme Court
decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.27 The Court held, five
to four, that due process requires that a jury must decide beyond a reasonable
doubt any fact that increases "the penalty of a crime beyond the prescribed
maximum," except the fact of a prior conviction.2"
ANALYSIS
Under the protections of the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution, a jury must find a criminal defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
for every element of a crime.29 The Supreme Court stated that these
constitutional protections were rooted in common law principles that protected
criminal defendants from oppressive governments." The common law
understanding of trial by jury is that the prosecution must prove to a group of
23. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2352-53. The appellate court concluded that the state legislature decided
to make the hate crime enhancement a sentencing factor as opposed to an element of the offense. Id. The
finding of bias was characterized as a finding of motive. Id. at 2352. The court considered motive a
traditional sentencing factor and opined that although the enhancement exposed defendants to greater
punishment, "one factor standing alone" was insufficient to render the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 2353
(quoting Apprendi, 698 A.2d. at 1269).
24. Apprendi, 698 A.2d at 1268.
25. New Jersey v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485, 496-97 (N.J. 1999). The New Jersey Supreme Court
further elaborated that the sentence enhancement statute did not create an independent offense with a
separate penalty, but instead merely gave weight to a factor which sentencing courts traditionally considered.
Id. at 494-95.
26. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2351, cert. granted, 528 U.S. 1018 (Nov. 29, 1999) (No. 99-478).
27. Id. at 2366-67.
28. Id. at 2362-63.
29. Id. at 2355-56 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1) ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"); U.S. CONST. amend. Vt ("In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed").
30. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2356.
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the criminal defendant's peers that every accusation is true.31 Common law
also requires jury verdicts to be based on the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard in criminal cases.32 The beyond a reasonable doubt standard requires
the prosecution to meet the highest level of persuasion in order to convince the
trier of fact that the criminal defendant is guilty of every element of a crime.33
Common law, however, did not distinguish between elements of a crime
and sentencing factors.34 The Supreme Court first used the term "sentencing
factor" in McMillan v. Pennsylvania.35 Based on its opinion in McMillan, the
Supreme Court in Apprendi described a sentencing factor as a "fact that was
not found by a jury but that could affect the sentence imposed by the judge."36
At common law, judges had very little discretion in determining a convicted
criminal's sentence.37  Historically, judges administratively imposed the
sentence that was required by law because each criminal statute stated a
specific punishment.38 Judges in the United States, however, have traditionally
exercised discretion in imposing criminal sentences by determining the
specific sentence within a range set forth by criminal statute.39 After a criminal
defendant is found guilty, the judge may take into consideration various facts
pertaining to the offense and the defendant and impose the appropriate
punishment within the statutory range.4°
Statutory ranges limit judges' discretion in sentencing and protect the
criminal defendant from receiving a punishment that exceeds the maximum
punishment permitted by the facts determined by the jury.4' In In Re
Winship,42 the Supreme Court held that due process requires a criminal
defendant to be found guilty of every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.43 The Supreme Court noted that due process protections are
needed because prosecution could potentially deprive the criminal defendant
of his liberty and socially stigmatize him.44 The Court pointed out that loss of
liberty and social stigma are heightened when a defendant is subjected to




34. Id. at 2356-57.
35. Id. at 2360. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 85-86 (1986).
36. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2360.
37. Id. at 2357.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2358.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 2359.
42. In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
43. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2359; See Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970).
44. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2359 (citing Winship, 397 U.S. at 363).
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circumstances and not on others.45 Therefore, the defendant should not be
deprived of due process protections when the extent of his punishment
depends on specific factors.46
In Mullaney v. Wilbur,47 the Supreme Court noted that some aspects of due
process and jury protections may apply to determinations that effect the length
of a criminal defendant's sentence.48 In Mullaney, the Supreme Court
invalidated a Maine statute that required a defendant to rebut a statutory
presumption that he acted with malice aforethought in order to reduce the
offense from murder punishable by life imprisonment, to manslaughter
punishable by twenty years imprisonment. 49 The State argued that the burden
placed on the defendant was irrelevant because a conviction of either murder
or manslaughter both resulted in loss of liberty and stigma.5° The Mullaney
Court rejected this argument, pointing out the substantial difference in
punishment for a conviction of murder versus manslaughter. 5' The Court held
that states could not deny defendants due process protections by characterizing
elements of different crimes as merely factors that increase punishment
because the amount of liberty and social stigma at risk vary with the degree of
punishment.52
The Supreme Court in Almendarez-Torres v. United States,53 however,
held that due process and jury protections are not violated when a judge
sentences the criminal defendant to a term higher than that attached to the
offense alleged in the indictment based on the defendant's prior conviction.54
In Almendarez-Torres, the Supreme Court rejected the defendant's objection
to being subjected to a potential sentence of twenty years rather than the two
years of imprisonment attached to the offense alleged in the indictment.5" The
Court stated that the use of prior convictions to increase a criminal defendant's
sentence need not comply with due process and jury protection requirements
because prior convictions were obtained through proceedings that provided
those procedural safeguards.56 The Apprendi Court emphasized that their
holding in Almendarez-Torres is a narrow exception to the general rule
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
48. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2359-60; see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697-98 (1975).
49. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2359-60.
50. Id. at 2360.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 523 U.S.224 (1998).
54. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2361-62; see Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 239-247.
55. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2361.
56. Id. at 2361-62.
Wash. & Lee Race & Ethnic Anc. L.J.
requiring due process protections. 5" The Apprendi Court also distinguished
Almendarez-Torres from Apprendi, pointing out that due process and Sixth
Amendment concerns in Almendarez-Torres were mitigated by the defendant's
admission to the facts concerning his prior convictions that enhanced his
sentence. 58
After exploring its prior decisions and the history on which those decisions
relied, the Court reaffirmed its conclusion in Jones v. United States59 and held
that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, like the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause, in conjunction with the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial requires that any fact that increases the maximum sentence
must be charged in the indictment and proven to a jury according to the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard, except facts regarding prior convictions. 6
The Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments require that a jury find a criminal
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for every element of a crime.6'
Under New Jersey's hate crime statute, however, a defendant's sentence
enhancement is not based on a prior conviction, but rather a judge's
determination by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant had a
biased purpose in committing the offense. 62 According to the New Jersey hate
crime statutory scheme, ajury could find a defendant guilty of a second-degree
crime, but the judge could then impose a punishment equivalent to a sentence
for a first-degree offense.63 Furthermore, while a jury is required to find guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge is only required to find that the
defendant had a biased motive by a preponderance of the evidence in order to
impose the punishment equivalent to an offense that is one degree higher.
64
Accordingly, the Court found New Jersey's procedure permitting this lower
standard for the hate crime "sentence enhancement" unconstitutional.65
New Jersey proffered three arguments in defense of the hate crime
sentencing enhancement. The court rejected each in turn. First, New Jersey
argued that the judge's finding of a "biased purpose" goes to the defendant's
motive which is a traditional "sentencing factor, and not an 'element' of an
offense.66 The Court dismissed this argument as a simple disagreement with
57. Id. at 2362.
58. Id.
59. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
60. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63; see Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999).
61. Id. at 2355-56 (citations omitted).
62. Id. at 2363; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2c:44-3(e) (West 1995 & Supp. 2000).
63. Apprendi, 120 S.CL at 2363.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2363-64.
66. Id. at 2363. Motive is the reason for the act, such as jealousy or greed; whereas intent is the
mental element required to perform an act to achieve a certain end. Motive, unlike intent, is not an element
of a crime, unless it is made to be an element by statute. See John S. Baker, United States v. Morrison and
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the rule it announced in the instant case.67 The Court concluded that the hate
crime enhancement required a judge to find that the defendant had the intent
or mens rea to intimidate based on race before imposing the sentence
enhancement. 68 Intent, stated the Court, is "as close as one might hope to
come to a core criminal offense 'element."' 69 The Court found it irrelevant
that the underlying offense for Apprendi's sentence enhancement had its own
mens rea requirement. 70 Without the finding of the required mens rea of
biased purpose for the sentence enhancement, Apprendi would not have been
put at risk of an increased statutory maximum.
7'
The Supreme Court in Mullaney noted that a state could not avoid
constitutional due process requirements by characterizing elements of a
criminal offense as factors that only effect punishment.72 The McMillan Court
also stated that schemes that do not permit a jury to determine facts that could
increase or add to a criminal defendant's punishment were constitutionally
questionable.73 The Apprendi Court followed this substance over form
approach and stated that the relevant inquiry is whether the "required finding
exposed the defendant to greater punishment than sanctioned by the jury
verdict., 74  The Apprendi Court focused its analysis not on whether the
legislature decided to call a fact an element of the crime or a sentencing factor,
but rather on the effect that the determination of the fact had on the extent of
punishment.75 The Court rejected the idea that the finding of biased purpose
was merely a traditional sentencing factor of motive because motive does not
increase a defendant's penal consequences. 7 The required finding of biased
purpose is an element of the crime because it exposes the defendant to a
greater punishment than that authorized by a jury's guilty verdict. New
Jersey's sentencing enhancement essentially turned Apprendi's conviction of
a second degree offense into a first degree offense by doubling the maximum
Other Arguments Against Federal "Hate Crime" Legislation, 80 B.U.L. REV. 1191, 1210(2000); Daniel
M. Levy, Hate Crime Laws: Cure or Placebo, 79 MICH. B.J. 674,678 (2000). New Jersey defended its hate
crime statutory scheme on grounds that the trial judge's finding of Apprendi's "biased purpose" was the
judge's determination of the traditional "sentencing factor" of motive for the underlying offense of
possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose and not an "element" of the separate offense under the hate





71. Apprendi, 120S. Ct. at 2365.
72. Id. at 2360 (citing Mullaney, 421 U.S. at698).
73. Id.; see McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85-88.
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penalty, therefore it squarely runs afoul of Winship's concern for the
assessment of the degree of culpability.7" The degree of culpability the
legislature chooses for "particular, factually distinct conduct" directly impacts
the defendant's liberty and stigmatization.79 Consequently, due process
protections are triggered.
Second, New Jersey argued that McMillan authorizes a trial judge to apply
the sentence enhancement for a biased purpose based upon a preponderance
of the evidence.' ° Because the New Jersey sentence enhancement is based on
an element of the crime and not a sentencing factor, it is constitutionally
impermissible for the legislature to authorize a judge to determine biased
purpose based on a preponderance of the evidence." Thus, a jury must
determine whether the defendant had a biased purpose when committing the
crime based on the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Further, the Court did
not find the fact that the enhancement did not create a separate offense
requiring separate punishment and disposition as dispositive.82 The Court
pointed to the fact that many states, including New Jersey, have made hate
crimes independent substantive offenses. 3  Thus, New Jersey's mere
placement of the enhancement in a sentencing statute does not define its true
character nor negate it as an essential element of the offense. 4
Third, New Jersey asserted that the legislature could authorize a judge to
consider factors and impose sentences beyond the statutory maximum in light
of Almendarez-Torres v. United States in which the Supreme Court held that
due process was not violated when a judge sentenced a defendant to a term
higher than that attached to the offenses alleged in the indictment based on the
defendant's prior conviction." The Court distinguished Almendarez-Torres
and considered it not to be controlling because recidivism, at issue in
Almendarez-Torres, does not go directly to the "'commission of the
offense.'"8 However, the hate crime enhancement in Apprendi was based on
a fact which directly related to what happened in the commission of the
offense and a jury should find this fact beyond a reasonable doubt. 7
Additionally, in the circumstance of a prior conviction, the defendant already
has enjoyed his right to a jury trial and his guilt previously has been proven
78. Id. at 2365.
79. id.
80. Id. at 2363-64.
81. Id. at 2365-66.
82. id.
83. Id. at 2366.
84. Id. at 2365.
85. Id. at 2364; see Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 239-47.
86. Apprendi, 120 S. Ct. at 2366.
87. Id. at 2365-66.
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beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.8 Therefore, because the rights were
properly protected, a trial judge could find the fact that a prior conviction
existed under a lesser standard of proof than beyond a reasonable doubt, 9
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court concluded in Apprendi that if a fact increases the
potential maximum penalty for a crime, the defendant is exposed to a greater
punishment than authorized by a jury's guilty verdict." Because of this
exposure to a greater loss of liberty, the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause and Sixth Amendment right to a jury require that a jury determine that
fact according to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.91 Based on this
reasoning, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the New Jersey
Supreme Court and remanded the case for further proceedings.92
States have enacted hate crime statues since the 1980s.93 These statutes
prescribe enhanced punishments for bias crimes based on the belief that a
crime motivated by the victim's race, ethnicity, gender, handicap, or sexual
orientation results in harm greater than that which would have otherwise
resulted.94 The purpose of hate crime statutes is to decrease, or at least
suppress, prejudices and bigotry by punishing such expressions.95
Although the Supreme Court did not rule on whether it is constitutional to
punish bias in Apprendi, the Court's decision in Apprendi may result in the
Court having to address this issue explicitly in the future. In Apprendi, the
Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a state's procedure for
imposing an enhanced sentence for a bias crime but did not address the
substantive question of whether the imposition of an enhanced sentence based
on bias is constitutional. Based on Apprendi, a state must prove bias beyond
a reasonable doubt as it would any element of a crime. But this seems contrary
to the fundamental principle of law that all defendants who are found guilty of
committing a criminal act with the required criminal mens rea are subject to
the same potential punishment regardless of their reasons for committing the
crime (except insanity and self-defense). 96 A future case may require the Court
to reconcile this conflict and raise the substantive question of whether it is
88. Id. at 2366.
89. Id.
90. Jd.at 2363.
91. Id. at 2355-56, 2362-63.
92. id. at 2366-67.
93. Baker, supra note 66, at 1208.
94. See id. at 1208-09.
95. See Levy, supra note 66, at 676.
96. See Baker, supra note 66, at 1210-11.
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constitutional for bias to be an element of a crime, in effect, challenging the
substantive constitutionality of hate crime laws themselves.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
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